There is in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit a relatively brief passage at the beginning of Chapter IV, “Self-Consciousness,” which may well be one of the most difficult passages in the whole Hegelian corpus, but which is also of supreme importance for coming to grips with the movement of Hegel’s thought, not only in the Phenomenology but in the entire “system.” It is precisely the difficulty of the passage, it would seem, that explains why it has not been given by commentators (...) an attention proportionate to its significance. So much attention has been focused on the “independence of self-consciousness,” expressed in the sections on “Lordship and Bondage,” “Stoicism and Skepticism” and “The Unhappy Consciousness” — which are, it is true, important and which lend themselves most readily to extended interpretation — that not enough attention has been given to the introductory section, entitled “The Truth of the Certainty of Self,” in which are enunciated the principles which regulate the whole movement of Hegel’s thought. The section might be described as the indispensable transition from those forms of consciousness, which are merely “objective” yet try to give themselves off as authentic knowing, to what Hegel considers to be the only possible way of authenticating the objectivity of human consciousness, i.e., the self, which claims to know, progressively coming to know itself, a self-knowing which will be knowing at all only if it culminates in “absolute knowing.” Only in the light of this section will the preface be intelligible; only in its light will the whole of the Phenomenology hang together. (shrink)

To those who are already familiar with the minute and detailed erudition which went into M.J. Petry’s three-volume translation of and commentary on Hegel’s “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit” as presented in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia, it will come as no surprise that the same author has presented in this sequel an equally meticulous study of the Berlin “Phenomenology of Spirit.” There is, however, a significant difference to be found in this latter work. Whereas, in the earlier “Philosophy of (...) Subjective Spirit”, Petry was content to translate and comment on the 1845 Zusätze, drawn from a variety of sources by Ludwig Boumann, he has been able in the present text to substitute a set of lecture notes written by Major Karl Gustav von Griesheim who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin during the Summer Term of 1825, the most complete single set of notes on those lectures now available. Petry assures us that Griesheim must have taken down Hegel’s lectures word for word, thus, presumably, assuring us of a text which is at once more reliable and more authoritative than the Encyclopedia text which Hegel himself had published - this, despite the many utter incoherences of Griesheim’s text! If nothing else, this explains the disproportionate number of notes devoted to Griesheim’s text rather than to Hegel’s; Petry is concerned not with the Encyclopedia but with the “Lectures” - and Griesheim’s transcript is the most reliable order to make sense out of Griesheim. (shrink)

To those who are already familiar with the minute and detailed erudition which went into M.J. Petry’s three-volume translation of and commentary on Hegel’s “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit” as presented in the 1830 edition of the Encyclopedia, it will come as no surprise that the same author has presented in this sequel an equally meticulous study of the Berlin “Phenomenology of Spirit.” There is, however, a significant difference to be found in this latter work. Whereas, in the earlier “Philosophy of (...) Subjective Spirit”, Petry was content to translate and comment on the 1845 Zusätze, drawn from a variety of sources by Ludwig Boumann, he has been able in the present text to substitute a set of lecture notes written by Major Karl Gustav von Griesheim who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin during the Summer Term of 1825, the most complete single set of notes on those lectures now available. Petry assures us that Griesheim must have taken down Hegel’s lectures word for word, thus, presumably, assuring us of a text which is at once more reliable and more authoritative than the Encyclopedia text which Hegel himself had published - this, despite the many utter incoherences of Griesheim’s text! If nothing else, this explains the disproportionate number of notes devoted to Griesheim’s text rather than to Hegel’s; Petry is concerned not with the Encyclopedia but with the “Lectures” - and Griesheim’s transcript is the most reliable order to make sense out of Griesheim. (shrink)

...If one takes a panoramic view of Hegel’s entire philosophical endeavor, the endeavor to come to grips with and to be committed to reality in the concrete, one is struck by one inescapable idea: the Hegelian enterprise is an extraordinarily unified and grandiose attempt to elaborate one concept, which Hegel sees as the root of all intelligibility, the concept of God, whatever that term is going to turn out to mean.......The question with which we are faced...is neither whether Hegel is (...) correct in what he says nor whether his interpreters are justified in what they say of him. Rather the question is one of finding out just what Hegel does say and of determining what impact that can have on our own thinking.......Why, then, the “Concept of God”? The answer is to be found in the culmination of the entire Hegelian system, “The Philosophy of Absolute Spirit.” Only in the light of “absolute Spirit” is anything Hegel says intelligible....in Hegel’s view, “absolute Spirit” is in fact to be identified with God and that, therefore, only if Hegel’s “Concept of God” is intelligible, will anything Hegel says be intelligible.—From the Introduction. (shrink)

A clear summary of Husserl's often obscure and always complex writings. . . . very instructive.-Ethics.

" This revision, based on continuing research, keeps this book in the forefront of Hegelian scholarship.

Introduction It could well seem that I am being facetious if I refer to this study as "a book in search of a title," but many an author will recognize that ...

"The most authoritative version of Hegel's "Introduction" to his lectures on the history of philosophy.

"The most authoritative version of Hegel's 'Introduction' to his lectures on the history of philosophy. The translation is a model of its kind." - International Philosophical Quarterly.

" Notre époque ne veut croire qu'à des "réalités". Or sa réalité la plus puissante est la science, voilà pourquoi c'est de la science philosophique dont notre époque a le plus grand besoin (...) et le plus grand progrès que puisse accomplir notre époque sera de reconnaître que l'intuition philosophique bien comprise est l'appréhension phénoménologique des essences. " Ce texte, écrit en 1911, constitue bien le manifeste par quoi s'ouvre la philosophie du XXè siècle. Husserl cherche à dépasser l'opposition toujours (...) actuelle entre positivisme et historicisme, en exigeant que la philosophie s'établisse à partir d'un nouveau commencement, plus radical que tous ceux qu'elle n'a jamais pu entreprendre, et qu'elle vise une rigueur qui l'affranchisse enfin des modèles hérités des sciences de la nature. Quelle qu'ait été l'histoire de la phénoménologie Husserlienne, l'exigence exprimée dans ce manifeste ne concerne pas seulement un courant de pensée particulier ; elle est consubstantielle à la réflexion philosophique elle-même. (shrink)

A clear summary of Husserl's often obscure and always complex writings. . . . very instructive.-Ethics.

Following on part 1 of Howard Kainz's analysis and commentary of Hegel's Phenomenology, published in 1976, the present volume contains what the author calls an "exegesis and interpretation" of chapters 6 to 8. It should be noted that the division of the commentary into two parts is in no way intended to indicate any radical division in Hegel's text. A more significant division within Kainz's text is that between the interpretation, which is original, free, sometimes even fanciful, and the commentary (...) contained in the footnotes, which are both copious and for the most part long. A significant feature of the commentary, incidentally, is that for all quotations from Hegel's text, which with reason are translated rather freely, the original German is given in the footnotes. The headings--both of chapters and of sections within each chapter-are Hegel's own, with subheadings, which may or may not accurately reflect Hegel's thinking. Chapters and major sections are preceded by "introductory remarks." All in all the "analysis" reads more like a guide to reading the Phenomenology--in the way the author reads it--than a careful analysis of Hegel's text. Frequently one suspects that one is being treated to an exposition of Kainz's rather than Hegel's thinking. Kainz is, however, extremely well-read, and his treatment is unquestionably erudite. There are, indeed, significant insights--particularly regarding chapters 6 and 8, but one frequently has the impression that the author is telling us what Hegel ought to have meant, which may well not be what Hegel actually did mean. It is not without value, however, to be confronted with what reading Hegel calls to mind in a scholar like Kainz.--Quentin Lauer, Fordham University. (shrink)

An excellent collection of lectures. The collection consists of the following: Carl C. Hempel, "On the Structure of Scientific Theories"; W. V. Quine, "Stimulus and Meaning"; Stuart Hampshire, "Aesthetic as the Middle Ground"; H. D. Aiken, "On the Concept of a Moral Principle"; J. O. Urmson, "Utilitarianism"; John Wild, "Is There an Existential A Priori?"; Aron Gurwitsch, "The Husserlian Conception of the Intentionality of Consciousness"; Quentin Lauer, "The Phenomenon of Reason"; and Walter Kaufmann, "The Riddle of Oedipus: Tragedy (...) and Philosophy." These essays represent original contributions to philosophy of science, ethics, and phenomenology and existentialism.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This book is a primer of contemporary philosophy of religion. It introduces in non-technical simplicity the four basic philosophical options which can inform a modern religious posture. The options are: process philosophy, phenomenology, language analysis, and existentialism. There is an introductory essay by the editor which describes the attitudes of Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, and Tillich toward philosophy and its relation to theology. Hartshorne's essay on process philosophy sets forth the bare bones of his bipolar theism and presents his case that (...) it is necessary for the creatures to contribute to the enrichment of God. The phenomenology article is written by Quentin Lauer, S.J. He deals briefly with Husserl's methodology and its applicability to the investigation of "religious consciousness." He describes four styles of phenomenology of religion represented by James, Van der Leeuw, Otto, and Scheler. He also discusses briefly Teilhard de Chardin. In the next essay, Frederick Ferré uses Socrates as his point of departure for showing the relevance of language analysis for policing religious discourse, both theistic and christological. He is skeptical, however, as to whether language analysis can be considered a resource for Christian thought. He points out that because it is in the Socratic tradition it can better serve as a midwife. John Macquarrie contributes the chapter on existentialism, showing its anthropocentrism and its reluctance to develop a doctrine of God. All the essays, originally the Alden-Tuthill lectures at Chicago Theological Seminary, raise provocative, important, and basic questions. They would serve well as an introductory text or as a catalyst for class discussion.—S. O. H. (shrink)